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Int roduct ion.
A fixture is an article or structure) which in itself person-
al property, has been annexed to or become accessory to the land.
The law of fixtures is one of the branches of the law of property
in which there is the utmost conflict in the adjudicated cases.
Some hold that articles have become roalty by reason of certain
annexatiornor connexationvr~ith the land while in others perhaps
they will decide that the chattels are personalty, and yet there
may be the same kind of connections.
It is of great importance to know the rules of law governing
the annexation and disannexation of chattels to the realty. The
rules differ where the relationship of the people to the land
differ. As to one class of persons the chattel may be personal
property and to another it may1 be considered realty.
The law has grown up under judicial decisions. The courts
have exercised a sort of legislatilre authority. It has grovm
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out of the law of accession, where the ownership of property
carried with it the right to all which that property produced or
all which became attc1 d to it. So it may be said that the
law of fixtures is of modern origin -- in ancient times the com.-
mon law maxim, UQuicquid planatur solo, solo cedit' was strictly
ei-forced.
Barron Park in Sheen vs. Rickie, 5 M. & W. 182, says that
the word is a modern word and is generally understood to mean any
article which a tenant has a power of removing.
In its broadest sense the term is used to denote a chattel
attached to the soil or freehold. Sherman vs. Walker, 20 Wend.
636; Farrar vs. Chauffetete, 5 Denio. 527.
The old rule that what became fixed to the ralty became
necessary to the freehold, and so partook of the legal properties,
and could not be severed without the consent of the ovn-r (El-es vs
Mawe East 38; Minshall vs. Loyd, 2 T1. & \7. 450) has been greatly
relaxed by ndM-n decisions makin7 excoptions to it in favro of
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the tenant as between landlord and tenant. And so throwgh the
different decisions the word has acquired a double meaning, as
being an article which can be removed and one which cannot be.
Some writers distinguish the two meanings of the word by using
the terms removable and non-remcvable fixtures, thus doi g away
with th. ambupuity created.
For the purpose of this thesis I shall use the term as
meaning an article which cannot be removed from the freehold when
attached to it. It 1s said that the courts Pt fist proceeded
very cautiously in their attempts to break the iron-clad rule of
the cormon law. And they placed their judgment on very subtile
distinctions. At first they allowed a removal in favor of a
tenant if he erected certain chattels at his own expense. As
early as the time of Queen Anne the courts recognized the rule of
removability in favor of erections and utensils attached for the
purpose of trade and ranm-facture.
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The next step to be taken was in favor of articles of
furniture and ornamentatiQn.When the principle in favor of trade
had been fully established they tried to bring agricultur
fixtures under the sway of the law. Some of the courts started
upon that journey but the English Court of King's Bench refused
to accede to this further innovation upon the general doctrine.
But this state of things must be broken away, for the state of
society had previous to this required that some qualifications
should be made for the enjoyment of the profits of the land..
Steam engines and machinery used for the working of the mines had
ancient
been taken from the strict working of theAlaw. This was because
they were considered as a species of trade fixtures. But it was
nevertheless the stepping stone to a full recorMition of the
doctrine of agriculture fixtures. As I said above the Judges
were always very cautious of the way in which they changed the
principles of the ancient cornion law. They wished to extend the
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doct,-.ie, yet they did not want it to appear that the ancient
principles were being encrouched upon. So they have taken
great pains to support their decision upon the facts of the
particular case and not upon any decided principle. Where there
is a direct precedent in favor of the removal of a particular
chattel, there may still be great uncertainty if the person does
not stand in the same situation as the party who was held to have
a right to remove.
It is always necessary to determine first what tests apply
to the removal of chattels and then to see whether as between the
particular parties to the controversy any of these tests will apply
Accordingly we will consider to some extent the tests recog,-
nized by the law as applicable to fixtures.
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Tests of fixtures.
The tests which determine whether an article is a fixture or
not are four.
First: Contract between the parties under which the
annexation was made.
Second:- Statutory regulation or constitutional provision.
These are paramount to express contract.
Third: Mode of annexation.
Fourth: Relation to the land of the annexer at the time of
annexation.
Whether an agreement between the parties, that articles
affixed to the freehold shall retain their character of personalty,
will be given effect depends upon their character and mode of
annexation: that is whether they can be removed without damaging
the freehold or destroyinp the articles themselves.
In Ford vs. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344, salt kettles were erected in
a building for the manufacture of salt. A chattel mortgaae was
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given covering the kettles, and the mortgage duly recorded. The
kettles were so set that they could not be removed without tearing
down some of the brick work. But this was necessary each year
as the kettles had to be reset once a year. They were held
personalty as against the subsequent purchaser of the salt works.
The court said that "It had been repeatedly held that erections
which by tiv general rules of law would belong to the freehold
have become chattels in consequence of a contract to that effect
between the owner of the land and the party claiming the erecticn
as personalty". But bhe Judge adds uthat there must necessarily
be a limitation to this doctrine which will exclude from its
influence cases where the mode of annexation is such that the
attribute of personal property cannot be predicated of the thing
in controversy.# 'As a house or building from the manner of
construction or materials made could not be removedl wJithout
practically destroying it, would not become a mere chattel by
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means of any agreement made concerning it.0 In regard to the
salt kettles the court thought that they had not been absorbed
or merged in the realty so that their identity as personal chattels
was lost and there was no reason why effect should not be ,iven
the agreement by which they should retain their character of
personalty.
Further authority for the law that a special agreement has
two exceptions ( -1- Where the chattels cannot be removed without
practically destroying them or injuring the freehold, and -2-
Where such agreement will injuriously affect bona fide purchasers
and creditors) may be found in Tyson vs. Post, 108 1N. Y. 217.
Plaintiff contracted to sell certain premises containing a plant
and machinery of a marine railway. Defendant advanced money to
the vendee to make payment. There was an oral agreement between
hin and the plaintiff and vendee that he should take title to the
plant and machinery as security, and that he could remove them at
-13-
any time. Premises were conveyed and plaintiff took mortgages
to secure the balance of the purchase money. The deed nor
mortgages contained no mention of the fixtures. The agreement
was held to be valid.
The court said: By agreement for the purpose of protecting
the rights of vendors of personalty or of creditors, chattels may
retain their character as chattels notwithstanding their annexa-
tion to the land in such a way as in absence of an agreement would
constitute them fixtures, so also it would seem to follow that by
convention the owner of the land may reimpress the character of
personalty on chattels which by annexation to the land have become
fixtures according, to the ordinary rule of law -provided only
that they have not. been so incorporated as to lose their identity
and the reconversion does not interfere with the ri hts of
creditors or third persons.
Then it is clear that if they have not lost their identity
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and it will not interfere with the rights of third persons the
agreement will be primarily recognized. In absence of any
agreement or statutory enactment the test will be reached by
considering the mode of annexation and the relation of the
annexer to the land at the time of the annexation. And no
matter what may be the relation of the annexer to the land at the
time of annexation the mode of annexation will be paramount to
it if a severance would seriously damage the realty or render
the chattel worthless.
There are certain presumptions which arise from the relation
the annexer bears to the realty at the time of annexation.
A person who is owner of the land is presumed to make a permanent
improvement when he affixes chattels to the land; while a temporary
occupier, such as a tenant, would not design a permanent annexation
The general rule is that this presumption may be rebutted by acts
of the owner to the contrary, as where he gives a chattel mortgage
-1-5-
on the article annexed to the realty. Brantly on Personal
Property, sec. 14. But I doubt whether this is exactly true
in this state. The Judge in Tiff vs. Horton seems to hold the
rule to be that a chattel mortgage does not in itself show
intention but an agreement with the ric-tpage is necessary. Wh
there is no outward expressed intention we must take into con-
sideration the circumstances connected with the annexation and I
degree of physical attachment in reaching the intention of the
party.
ere
bhe
In Ward vs. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 413, mirror frames were
actually annexed too the realty. They were annexed during the
process of building and their removal would leave unfinished walls
and require work upon the house to supply and repair their
absence. They were deemed to be fixtures. I think that it
may be safe to say that in all cases the courts will no- allow
the expressed intention to govern if there is such an annexation
as in Ward vs. Kilpatric? above; except as between the parties to
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the agreement, and of course the parties as between themselves
may agree to any thing even to the destruction of the chattels.
But when the rights of third parties are involved their agree-
ment will be of no effect.
In McKeage vs. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 40, mirrors
and gas fixtures did not pass with the realty although the owner
declared that he intended them to 7o with the house. The court
held that they were not fixtures because they were not attached
to the building sufficiently to become part of it, thus recogniz-
ing the fact that the actual intention of the party is not always
a decisive test for a fixture.
In Tiff vs. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377, plaintiff sold to B an
engine and boiler to be put in an elevator owned by f . A
chattel mortgage was executed upon the property sold and the
mortgage contained a clause stating that the engine and boiler
should remain personal property until the notes were paid,
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notwithstanding the manner in which they should be put in the
elevator. They were placed outside the elevator and an engine
house built over them. A prior mortgage upon the premises was
foreclosed and the defendant became 'he purchaser. The plaintiff
demanded the engine and boiler but they were r-fused. He then
brings an action of conversion. The court held that they were
chattels. So from this case i will be sr3en that chattels may
be annexed to the freehold and still hold their character of
personal property. This case was decided upon the ground of
itention but it recognized the two exceptions above as being
valid ones to this rule.
When there is no agreement or statutory regulation to govern
there are three requisites in the commonly accepted criterion.
They are:-First; Actual annexation to the realty or something
appurtenant thereto. Second: Application to the use or purpose
to which that part of the realty with which it is connectead is
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appropriated. Third: The intention of the party makiig the
annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold.
McRea vs. Central Nat. Bank of Troy, 66 N. Y. 489,
Brantly lays dorn the rule as follows and says that it is the more
logical division to make the intention of the annexer the general
principle and in requiring this intention to be inferrdd from
his relation to the land, from the mode of annexation and from
the appropriation of the chattel to permanent use on or with the
land.
It has been stated that a secret intention would
govern, but this is incorrect as vrinl be seen by the followig
case of Snedeker vs. Warring. In getting at the reasonable
presumable intent the oath of the arnv3xer as to what he intended
counts for but little for in Snedeker vs. Warring, 12 N. Y. 170,
Judge Parker says: 'I lay entirely out of view in this case the
fact that Thorn testified he inbended to sell the stat'ie when an
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opportunity should offer. His secret intention in that respect
can have no le~itimate bearing on the question. He clearly
intended to make use of the statue to ornament his groumds, wlhen
he erected for it a permanent mound and base, and a purchaser had
a right so to infer and to be governed by the manifest and
unmistakable evidence of intention.'
There are two modes of annexation, actual and constructive;
some courts follow the one and some the other. Tlaly of the older
cases in this state held that actual annexation was necessary as
in Walker vs. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636, where the court refused
machines a part of the realty because they were in no manner
affixed or fastened to the building. Brantly says the trend of
recent cases is towards the establishment of a more rational
doctrine of constructive annexation.
The first case holding to the doctrine of constructive
annexation in America, was Farrar vs. Stackpole, 19 Am. Dec. 201t
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where chains used for drawing up logs in a saw-mill ard which
were not permanently attached) but could be hooked and unhooked,
were held as a part of the real estate and passed upon a sale of
the mill because they were essential to its use.
The case of Bishop vs. Bishop, 11 N. Y. 124, holds hop poles
taken down and piled in the yard pass with the realty as a part of
it. They were necessary to the proper cultivation of the crop.
Thus chattels need not be actually annexed to the land, as long
as they are necessary to i§s proper use.
In the case of Randall vs. Elwell, 52 N. Y. 523, the rolling
stock of a railroad was held to be personal property. It seoms
that the courts thought it not advisable to extend the doctrine
of constructive annexation; nor to hold it a fixture because of
its fixture. But instead they applied the old rule that there
must be some annexation or permanence to the road. The court
said rollin7 stock was accessory to the trade and buisiness of the
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road and not to the road itself.
I think this line of cases shows that an intention will not
always govern to make a chattel realty but that the mode of
annexation must be taken into consideration. Probably as far as
any intent is concerned the companies intend to make their
equipment a part of the road and do not intend to take their cars
and engines off until they are good for no more service.
It may be hard to see any good distinction between the cases
where constructive annexation is allowed to 7overn, and the r6llir,
stock cases, but the courts in this state have clearly made that
distinction and we must be governed by it.
The Judge in Beardsley vs. Ontario Bank, 31 Barb. 634, sums
up the rule in Walker vs. Sherman above. He says: 'The general
rule to be deduced from that case is that whatever its use or
object unless the thin be physically annexed to the freehold in
some way, it will not pass under a grant of the land from vendor
-22-
to vendee, while the case of constructive annexationi where
article is seldom or never corporeally attached to the realty,
are few and may be set down as exceptions to the qeneral rule.
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III.
Persons between whom the question of fixtures arises.
(a) Landlord and tenant
It is largely a question of intention whether machinery
placed in a building will be held real estate or not. Where the
case has arisen between landlord and tenant t1e principle has been
laid down that fixtures erected by a tenant in a building for
purposes of trade may be removed by him at any time during his
term, and this because they are necessary for carrying on his trad
Where a person is not the owner of the fee ther3 is no presumption
that he intended to make the chattels a part thereof. Watts
Campbell Co. vs. Yuengling, 51 Hun 304.
The reason why the rule between landlord and tenant is so
liberal is because the law wishes to encourage industry. If the
iron clad rule, that whatever was attached to the realestate
would be considered a part of it, was enforced) a tenant wiould be
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very careful what additions he put upon the land unless there was
an agreement as to their removability. The right of tenant was
definitely settled in Pools' case, 1 Salk. 368, and has been
followed by many others recognizing the right of removal on the
ground of public policy as it afforded encouragement to trade.
The case of the Matter of the City of Buffalo, 1 St. Ref. 742,
also holds that accessories for the purpose of trade or manuflacturd
may be removed. A person leased certain premises and built ice
houses thereon; before the lease expired the City condemed the
premises for a public park and it was held that there could be no
compensation given for the ice houses as they were personal
property. There was no agreement between the parties that the
buildings should remain personal property but the court went upon
the theory that the b-ftildings were erected for purposes of trade
and manufacture and there was a right to remove them.
An agreement between the parties will be construed strictly.
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Where there is an agreement between the lessor and lessee mthat
all improvements placed in said buildings by the lessees, viz.
elevators, boilers, heating apparatus, etc. shall be deemed
fixtures not to be removed', nevertheless a small engine, a duplex
pump and a pressure tank used for the purpose of operating an
electrical apparatus for lighting store and operating passenger
elevators in an adjoining building, were held to be personal
property. The court said they would not construe the word
"improvements"1 to mean more than the articles specified in the
concluding clause. The object of such a clause was to define and
particularize that which before was general. And the uetc.' at
the end would not enlarge its scope further than to clearly
indicate that it was the intention of the parties to include
within its terms articles directly connected with those specified.
Loeser vs. Liebman, 39 St. Ref. 12.
The principle of the removability of fixtures erected for
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purposes of trade was further held in Ombony vs. Jones, 19 N. Y.
234. The lessee erected a ball-room which rested upon stone
posts and could be removed without injury to the freehold. It
was held to be vithin the principle of trade fixtures and so
removable by the tenant. It also held that the right of the
tenant passed to another who had purchased the building tunder
execution on a judgment establishing his lien. That there
need be no agreement in order to allow the enant to remove is
further shown in Lewis vs. N. 0. & P. Co., where the Judge says:
'The purpose for which the building was erected and the manner of
its erection) and the fact that it was erected by a tenant to
carry out the business in which he was embarked . . . ..
.. . .. -all tend to the correctness of the conclusion
that even without the agreement the lessee would have had the
right in any event, to remove the building at the expiration of
the lease as being his own property and the lessor would have had
-27-
no right to prevent him from making such remova!.
As between landlord and tenant, except in so far as limited
by the lease, he has the right to erect structures for the
purpose of carrying on his business, and remove them within the
term unless the effect will be to commit waste or do serious
injury to the realty. It will not be cornitting waste or doing
injury to the realty for a tenant to take out an old engine and
put in a new one, and the tenant may remove such enLgine before
the termination of the lease. Andrews vs. D. B. Co., 132 N. Y.
348.
In the early English cases at least it was held that
agricultur) fixtures did not come under the same rule as trade
fixtures, but the American courts have put them upon the same
basis as trade fixtures. In Holmes vs. Tremper, 20 Johns. 29,
a tenant had erected a cider mill at her ovm expense and for her
own use. It was held that she had a right to remove the mill.
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Oh. J. Spencer in writing the opinion said: 2I confess I never
could perceive the reason, justice or equity of the old cases,
which gave to the landlord such kind of erections as were merely
for use and convenience of the tenant, the removal of which neither
defrauds nor does the least injury to the landlord."
In the case of fixtures between the landlord and tenant if
the removal will do injury to the realty then they cannot be
removed without permission from the landlord. Brantly 24.
Manure as between landlord and tenant cannot be removed but
is considered a part of the realty. Goodrich vs. Jones, 2 Hill 142.
This is true even if it is stacked in piles. Also the rule is
considered stronger in the case of vendee and vendor; heir and
executor.
Fixtures for domestic convenience or ornamentation may be
removed by the tenant, such as hangings, looking glassest tapestry,
wainscot, ornamental chirney pieces, stoves, grates, chandeliers,
-29-
gas fixtures, etc.) where no injury to the freehold will result.
(b) Mortgagor and Mortgagee
Vendor and Vendee
principles
The rules and 7overning fixtures are the same
between the two classes of persons-r- mortgagor and mortgageet and
vendor and vendee-s Snedeker vs. Warring, 12 N. Y. 170. The
same presumption of law arises between each, that whatever chattels
he annexes to the land he does so for the purpose of making a
permanent improvement. In Murdock vs. Gifford, 18 N. Y. 28,
certain looms in a mill were in question. The looms were placed
i the factory and fastened to the floor by means of screws merely
for the purpose of steadying them. Also thrcould be removed
without injury to themselves or the building. A mortgage was
given to the plaintiff covering the real estate. Defendant
claims priority over the mortgage. Held that the chattels were
personalty and could be severed. The decision went upon the
-30-
ground that they could be removed without injury to themselves
or the realty. The Judge in deliverinF the opinion of the
court speaks of a case decided by Lord T ansfield, which furnishes
the criterion by which the character of chattels annexed to the
freehold may be determined. The case was one of salt pans in a
salt works. Lord T.ansfield said: 'The inheritance cannot be
enjoyed without them. They are accessories necessary to the
enjoyment and use of the principal." The case was decided upon
the theory that the pans had a specific relation to the
inheritance. They were Adapted to the use in connection with
the inheritance and if removed would lose all the value they had
J connection with the realty and become mersly old iron. This
principle could not make the chattels in Murdock vs. Gifford
above realty because if removed the looms were in just as good
condition and could be used wherever wanted just the same as
though never attached to any realty.
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In Ward vs. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 420, although the question
was not between vendor and vendee, yet Judge Finch expresses his
opinion that the mirrors would have passed with the realty if
such had been the question, and this because there was such physi-
cal attachment that they could not be removed without rendering the
building unfinished. The case of McKeage vs. Hanover Fire
Ins. Co.5 81 N. Y. 38, is not in conflict with this principle
because the physical attachment was not such as to injure the
freehold if they were removed, and this was the reason why the
chattels did not pass under a mortgage of the real estate.
If a person acquires title under a mortgage of real estate
while that property is subject to a lease he takes the place of
the lessor and any right of removal which the tenant had before
the sale, he has still. Globe Marble Mills Co. vs. Quinn, 76 N. Y
23. The facts of the case are substantially these. A was
owner of the premises and he leased the same to B for ten years.
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The lease contained a covenant of sale to the lessee or his
assigns. B assigned the l~ase to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
erected a mill with the necessary machinery therein. A after-
wards conveyed the premises to C subject to the said lease and
also a mortgage of $8,000 made by him. C then conveyed to the
plaintiff subject to all incumbrances. Mortgage was foreclosed
and B bought it under foreclosure. He claims title to the
chattels under the sale. Held that they were personal property
because the expressed and presumed intent was that the machinery
when it was put into the mill should retain its personal character,
and there was nothing afterwards to indicate any changed intention.
Further the interest he had as lessee in the fixtures did not
merge when he acquired the fee because it was not an interest
carved out of the fee. He also had notice at the time of the
sale that the fixtures were claimed as personalty and so he was
not defrauded in any way.
-33-
It is a general rule that where the owner of premises puts
up any chattel of a permanent nature it will become a part of
the realty although it may be removed without any injury to the
real estate. But if an intention is shovin that he did not
intend it to become a part of the realty this rule will not apply.
Judge Hand in Buckley vs. Buckley, 11 Barb. 43-63, laid down
the rule thus: 'The rule in this state as between grantor and
grantee, mortgagor and mortgagee, heir and personal representa-
tivel still is that whatever is annexed or affixed to the free-
hold by being let Into the soil or affixed to it or to some
erection upon it to be habitually used there, particularly if for
the purpose of enjoying he realty or some profit therefrom, is a
part of the freehold'.
A chattel mortgage filed is notice to anyone who deals with
them as chattels and deprives a person of the right to claim the
articles under any right of his. Rowland vs. West, 43 St. Ref.
-34-
698. The intention of the parties in regard to whether
machinery placed in a mill after the execution of a mortgage,
is to be personalty or not may be shovm by the manner in which
the machinery was placed in the mill. Permanent improvements
put upon the real estate after the execution of a mortgage, are
considered a part of the realty. Cooper vs. Harvey, 41 St. Ref.
594.
In the case of Kircham vs. Lapp, 46 St. Ref. 687, a rose
bush and faucet were held to be fixtures, but a child's play
house and the chandeliers were considered to be personal property.
The court thought the faucet would pass with the deed because
it was a necessary adjunct to the boiler. On the other hand,
they hold the chandeliers to be removable. I cannot see any
good reason why they should distinguish between the two chattels.
For the decision reached in the case of the chandeliers the
Judge cites McKeage vs. Hanover Ins. Co., 81 N. Y. 38. In
that case gas fixtures were held personalty because they were
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not permanently annexed but simply screwed on to the pipes.
And further because the articles were in their nature mere
furniture. I think the faucet could be as easily detached
from the pipes as the chandelier, and is not the chandelier as
necessary for the enjoyment of the premises and as much a
necessary adjunct to the gas pipes as the faucet is to the boiler?
If the parties to a sale wish to reserve the fixtures it must be
done in writing for a parol agreement will be given no effect
by the courts. Leonard vs. Clough, 133 N. Y. 292.
A case that has been much cited and which involves the
question of a mortgage is Voorhees vs. McGinnis, 48 N. Y. 278.
Certain machines were bought and placed in a buildin.g. Before
beir annexed a chattel mortgage was given thereon. Afterwards
a mortgage of the real estate was given to the plaintiff. The
chattels were removed by the defendant. Held that they were
a part of the r3alty notwithstanding the chattel mortga;e. The
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case does not show whether the mortgage was recorded or not.
There was no special intent, on the part of the owner, whether
he would make them fixtures or not. The machines were
substantially put up but not in such a marnner as would do injury
to the walls of the building if r-emoved, but all was well adapted
for use in the building. Although this case has not been direct-
ly over-ruled, yet it has been distinguished in many instances.
In Tifft vs. Horton the court decided directly opposite in
principle (namely that the mortgagee of th3 realty cannot hold
articles covered by a chattel mortgage) yet it do3s not over-ruli
it but says in regard to it: 'So in Voorhees vs. McGinnis it is
conceded that if the intention of the mor6,7agor of the land had
been that chattels annexed were to be removed the prior mor',7agee
could not have held them agaLnst the recei7rir of the mortgagor'.
As I have stated before) in Tifft vs. Horton, the fact that
there was a chattel mortgage coverinp the articles did not make
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them personalty but the clear intm' of the part.ies as manifest-
ed in thel: agreement. Two Judges in Voorhees vs. T',Tc2nis
dissent from the prevailing opinion and base thei, judrqent on
the ground that the chattels were for the purpose of trade and
manufacture and vere capable of being removed without injury to
the real estate. But I think that the rule governing trade
fixtures applies only between landlord and tenant. The differ-
ence between Tifft vs. Horton and Voorhees vs. McGinnis, I think
might be considered thus: in the latter there was no actual
intent manifested, while in the former the agreement stated the
goods were to rem~ain personalty. In the absence of any
agreement showing intent the courts must infer such intent from
the circumstances of annexation.
A case which seems to approve the doctrine in Voorhees vs.
McGinnis is Rowland vs. West, 43 St. Ref. '701, in which the
Judge says: 'It could not be correrted into realty by simply
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calling it so nor by an agreemen, to consider it such. It
might however be included as chattels i n the r3al estate
mortgage and those chattels might subsequently be annexed to the
freehold so as to become a part of the realty and so inure to
the benefit of the mortgagee, and that even with the effect of
deprivng, the defendant of the benefit, of the prior lien of his
chattel ortFa~ e and to remit him to his r:medy against the
mortgagor for his wrongful conversion of the chattels into realty'.
A case showing that the actual intent will not govern
where the interests of third parties, who have no noticea, are
at stake, will be shown by Fryatt vs. Sullivan Co., 5 Hill 116,
where A hired certain machinery of B and put it into his mill in
such a manner that it became a par-t of his r-al estate; he then
mortgaged his real estate to C. The mortgage was foreclosed
and C bought the premises. It was held that he could hold the
machinery as against the oviner B. This was because it had
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become a part of the realty by annexation. The same principle
has been upheld in Rowland vs. West above. In Fryatt vs.
Sullivan Co. it did not state in what manner the machinery was
annexed only that it could not be removed without injury to the
real estate.
Where thereis a law requiring the filina of a conditional
sale of a chattel or a mortage in order to hold it against
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, the failure
to do so v.ill not relieve the plaintiff from proving that he is
one of the class of persons in whose favor the statute was passed.
DuIfus vs. Howard Furnace Co., 8 App. Div. b72.
(c) Heir and Executor; Debtor and Creditor, etc.
In this state by 9 2712 sub. div. 4 Code Civil Procedure,
NThings annexed to the freehold or to any building for the
purposes of trade or manufacture and not fixed into the wall of
a house so as to be essential to its support are deemed personal
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property of the testator or intestate'.
If there is a chattel mortgage put on the fixtures at the
time of the annexation an execution creditor of the debtor can
have no greater rights than the debtor had. Sisson vs. Hibbard,
75 N. Y. 542. The facts were as follows: An engine and boiler
were sold by A to B. The purchase price of the chattels was
secured by a mortgage. The referee found that they were so
fastened that, but for the chattel mortgage, they would have
become a part of the real estate. B re-transferred the engine
and boiler to A in default iri payment of the mortgage but agreed
to let them remain on the premises until he should desire to
remove them. Later they were removed. Plaintiff claims them
as buyer of the land. Held that he could not rec6ver. The
court thought that the findings of the referee did not disclose
such a permanent annexation of the machinery to the freehold as
to preclude the owner of the land from making a valid agreement
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with the vendors that it should continue as between the parties
to be personal property. The buildig in which the machinery
was, was not much more than a temporary shelter.
It might be inferred from what the Judge says of the manner
of annexation that if there had been a more permanent annexation
the case would have gone differently. But case clearly shows
that a judgment creditor can acquire no greater interest than
the judgment debtor had.
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IV.
When the chattel must be removed b the tenant if removable.
Any agreement as to time will control but if there is no
agreement then there are three cases to be considered. First,
where he quits at the end of the term. Secondl where the
tenant holds over. Third) where he accepts a new lease on
different terms making no resei-Tation of the fixtures.
The older cases held that he had a right to remove even
where his lease had expired and that he could re-enter to do
so, but he would be liable in trespass. It was so held in
Holmes vs. Trumpery 20 Johns. 29. But I think that is no longer
good law in this state.
If the tenant accepts a new lease without any reservation
of the fixtures) then his right to remove is lost; it was so
held in Loghram vs. Ross, 45 17. Y. '792. This case has since been
criticised in Lewis vs. 0. 1. & P. Co. , 125 N. Y. 341, ,'here
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Judge Peckham says: "The d~cision in that case was placed
upon quite technical reasoning supported it is true by some
authorities but it is not one of those cases whose principle
should be extended'. The takinR of the new lease is equiva-
lent, it is said, to a surrender of the premises, as they
exist, to the landlord, and the taking of them again from him
in the same condition. And so at the end of his second lease
he would be bound to surrender them in like condition. Judge
Peckham contended there ought to be no difference in the cases
where the tenant was holding over without any new lease and where
such new lease had been made. The right to remove where he
is simply holding over is certainly recogiized by good authority.
In Talbot vs. Cruger, 151 N. Y. 120 the court seems to
approve the decision in Loghram vs. Ross cited above, by hold-
ing that a tenant had no right to the fixtures under a new lease.
The JudFe in this case does not even speak of the case in 125 N. Y,
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I think that undoubtedly this case settles the law in this state.
The case is a rmach stronger case in favor of the landlord for
the tenant was induced to surrender the premises by signing a
paper which she thought to be a nevi lease but which in fact was
a surrender in writing. So the tenant really unwillingly gave
up the premises and there was no actual consent.
Where there is a right of re-entry by the landlord for breach
of condition and such re-entry takes place the tenant has no
right after this to remove the fixtures. Pugh vs. Arton L. R.j
8 Exch. 626.
If the tenant quits the premises leaving the fixtures
behind him then the right to remove is lost, lmor his leaving
raises the presumption that he intended to abandon them. But
this presumption never arises while he remains in possession;
this is why he has a right to remove them where he is holding
over. Dubois vs. Kelly, 10 Barb. 496. A different rule
governs those cases where the tenacy is uncertain, (as at will or
for life) and the law will allow a removal of the fixtures
after the term if it is done within a reasonable time. Haflich
vs. Stober, 11 Ohio St. 482; Oribonv vs. Jones, 19 N. Y. 234.
Where there is a stipulation that compensation shall be mado
at the end of the term fo' such fixtures as may be erected
during its continuance, it may entitle the tenant -o remain in
possession until the agreerint is fulfilled o2 to remove the
fixtures subsequently. Van Rensselaer vs. Penniman) 6 '7 end. 569.
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v_.
The severance of fixtures.
Where a party has full ownership over the land he has a
right to sever the fixtures and mra]e them personalty but such
severance must be made with a vicar of making them chattels.
Goodrich vs. Jones, 2 Hill 142. This was a case where fencing
materials had been detached from the freehold but only tempor-
arily. It was held that where there was axi accidental or
temporary detachment, without any intent of the oNver to divert
them from their use, it worked no change in their nature.
In Walker vs. Sherman, 20 Wend. 639, Justice Cowen said,
"A t1emporary disannexation and removal as of a mill stone to be
picked or an anvil to be repaired will not take away its character
as a part of the freehold".
So I think it may safely be laid dovin as a rule) that any
severance of a fixture by the owner will not make i a chattel
personal unless there was an Intent to do so.
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VI
Conclusion.
In closing I wish to sum up briefly a few of the rules and
tests reached in +he foregoing discussion. There are always
four tests to be held in mind and when we wish to determine
whether any chattel is a fixture or not we are obliged to
consider them all and see which one or ones we shall use.
We have seen that the question arises between different
classes of persons ad the rule Foverninc one may not apply to
the others.
The intention of the party indicated by some apreeiamnt will
always be controlling unless the annexation is such that it will
injure the freehold or itself in removin7 it. And in Tyson vs.
Post the Judge spe&ks of another exception to the agreement, that
is where bona fide purchasers or creditors would be injured.
There are certain presumptions to be overcome hich arise
through the relation of the land to the annexer. If he is
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ovmer or vendee the presumption is that a permanent improvement
was intended, and this must be overcome before a chattel
affixed to the real estate will be held personalty. On the
other hand a tenant is not presumed to make a permanent
improvement.
A tenant has a right to remove chattels erected for the
purpose of trade and manufacture, for agriculturM purposes for
domestic convenience and ornamentation, when there will be no
waste or injury to the freehold estate.
In considerirr- the cases involving a chattel mortgage
perhaps we can best sum it up as follows. A chattel mortgage
filed is notice only to those who treat them as chattels. (Rowland
vs. West) If there is only a chattel mortgage and nothing
else to show intention to make the chattel personalty, the
courts will consider the chattel realty. Voorhees vs. McGinnis,
Tiffb vs. Horton.
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If there is an agreement that the chattels shall remain
personalty then it governs unless there is such an attachment
as will make the chattel worthless as such or injure the
freehold if removed; if so then such condition takes priority
over the agreement. But if there is no intent shovn either
way and the chattel is substantially fastened but, not so as to
do any damage to the realty or itself if removed it will be
considered real estate. This can be put on the ground that
there is but slight evidence to overcome the great presumption
that it is a part of the realty.
We have seen that a tenant must re move the fixtures during
his term, unless holding over. If there is a new lease then
his right has been lost unless they are reserved. Where the
term is uncertain he may remove them within a reasonable time
after the termination of the tenancy.
In regard to the se'rerance of fixtures, I think an
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ovrner of the land may sever any article and make it personalty
if he does so with such an intent.
